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Abstract
This paper deriyes a new and intuitive estimation procedure for the term structure under
potential tax arbitrage. No a priori assumptions regarding the equality of the prices
and present values of bonds are made. The data are employed to determine whether
this equality holds, and an appropriate estimator is thereby endogenously derived. The
suggested estimator is based on the optimizing behavior of an investor in a market
with frictions, and emerges directly from the solution of the dual of the no-arbitrage
optimization problem, tn addition, the proposed estimator benefits from being both
theoretically sound and straightforward to apply.
I. Introduction
In recent years, it has been recognized that tax regulations may generate
arbitrage opportunities in the bond market. This has brought into doubt the va-
lidity of traditional methods used to estimate the term structure of interest rates.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest an appropriate method for estimating the
term structure in the face of such tax regulations.
Traditionally, it has been assumed that, but for noise, the price of a bond
would equal the present value of its cash flow. Regressing bond prices on
cash flows was, therefore, considered a correct method of estimating the term
structure of interest rates. Schaefer (1982b), however, showed that deviations
of the price of a bond from its present value may be due to more than just
noise: tax regulations that create arbitrage opportunities may drive a wedge
between prices and present values.' One implication of such a wedge is that
regression analysis is an inappropriate method of estimating the term structure.
An altemative estimator of the term structure was proposed by Schaefer (1981),
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but this estimator is deficient: it is both arbitrary and based on an unrealistic
assumption of market frictions.
This paper derives a new and intuitive estimation procedure for the term
structure, which arises from the assumption that arbitrage opportunities are not
available in equilbrium. No a priori assumption regarding the equality of the
prices and present values of bonds is made. Rather, the data determine whether
this equality holds and an appropriate estimator is thereby endogenously de-
termined. In addition, the proposed estimation procedure is consistent with
utility maximization and benefits from being based on a realistic view of market
frictions.
Section II examines tax arbitrage in relation to the potential inequality
between bond prices and their present values. In Section III, utility maximization
by investors is used to derive the proposed estimator. The compatibility of
the estimator with the fundamental assumption that in equilibrium all arbitrage
opportunities must be exhausted is considered in Section IV as is the difference
between the estimator proposed in this paper and the estimator suggested by
Schaefer. Section V offers conclusions.
II. Tax Arbitrage and the Term Structure of Interest Rates
Schaefer (1982b) shows that for individuals in some tax brackets, certain
bonds may be overpriced. Therefore, arbitrage opportunities may be present
and a bond market equilibrium need not exist. To ensure the existence of an
equilibrium, Schaefer assumes that short sales are prohibited, implying that for
each tax bracket, the present value of a bond is smaller than or equal to its
price. The equilibrium generated by this ban on short sales is characterized by
different individuals specializing in the holding of certain subsets of all bonds.
A market with such specialized holding of assets is described as having clientele
effects.
As a result of the weak inequality between present values and bond prices,
the number of feasible term structure estimators (vectors of discount rates) is infi-
nite. Consequently, Schaefer's solution can be viewed as too effective: whereas
in the absence of frictions no consistent term structure may be feasible, the intro-
duction of an absolute prohibition on short sales generates an infinity of feasible
term structures. Schaefer's (1981) choice of an estimator is a term structure that
maximizes the present value of an arbitrary prespecified cash flow. As a result,
his proposed estimator is similarly arbitrary.^
Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984) argue that tax regulations will not induce a
wedge between prices and present values, but their result appears to be based
on the assumption that money is not fungible.^ In contrast, Dammon and Green
(1987) determine that clientele effects do, in general, emerge in asset markets
^After Schaefer's (1982b) paper, it was accepted that regression is an incorrect method of
estimating the term structure. This is because the tax-based wedge between prices and present
values causes the difference between the price of a bond and its present value to vary across bonds.
Nonetheless, regression continued to be used for its numerical tractability (Jordan (1984)). and also
perhaps because of the deficiencies in the altemative estimator suggested by Schaefer (1981),
'See Prisman (1990) for an examination of their model.
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with perfectly correlated securities.'* Since such securities abound in the bond
markets (in contrast with the equity market), Dammon and Green's results con-
firm the need for a new estimation method for the term structure. Also, Dammon
and Green's argument, that arbitrage opportunities need not generate clientele
effects if bonds are imperfectly correlated, is partially dependent on the absence
of tax-exempt investors. Since a large proportion of investors in the bond mar-
ket is tax exempt, tax arbitrage is likely to induce clientele effects into the bond
market even when bonds are not perfectly correlated.^
Let A'^ he the net-of-tax payments matrix of an individual in tax bracket
£. Element a,y of A^ is the after-tax cash flow made to the investor by bond /
in period7,-g = l , . . . , r , / '= l,...,m,j- l,...,t. Let P be the column vector of
bond prices F = (/»,,...,/>„). Also, let x = (x,,... ,x«) and >> = (y,,...,>>„) be
column vectors such that Xi,yj are, respectively, the number of units of bond /
bought and the number of units of bond j sold short by the investor.
Following Ross (1978), the absence of arbitrage opportunities is defined
by the satisfaction of the condition,
(1) min{x'P-y'Ps.t. {x-y)'A^>0} = 0 for all ^  = 1,... ,r.
It is well known that the no-arbitrage condition defined above holds if
and only if for every tax bracket £, there exists a vector of discount factors
d^ = {df,...,df) > 0 such that A^d^ = P. Dammon and Green establish that
this condition will be satisfied only if
r
(2) f]Q^ i^0 where Q^ ={q\ there exists a d > 0, A^d = q}.
A necessary and sufficient condition for A^d^ to equal P for each tax
bracket is that P belongs to the above intersection. Hence, (2) is only a neces-
sary condition for the equilibrium to be free of clientele effects. The example
used by Schaefer (1982b) to demonstrate that tax regulations may lead to the
nonexistence of an equilibrium can now be seen as a simple case (two bonds,
two time periods, and two tax brackets) of fj^^, Q^ = 0 This simple case does
not comply even with Dammon and Green's necessary condition for an equilib-
rium without clientele effects. It is, therefore, very unlikely that the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the absence of arbitrage opportunities will be satis-
fied in the typically complex cases encountered in actual markets. Consequently,
it is probable that the existence of an equilibrium depends on the presence of
frictions that limit arbitrage activity. Thus, a bond market equilibrium is likely
to be characterized by clientele effects. This implies that for individuals in cer-
tain tax brackets the equilibrium prices of some bonds may be lower than their
present values. An estimator of the tenn structure that relies on the equality
•"See Dammon and Green (1987). p, 1144, line 31, and p, 1155, last paragraph.
Given progressive taxation, Dammon and Green argue that arbitrage profits will increase and
converge the marginal tax rates of investors until no further tax arbitrage opportunities exist. Hence,
arbitrage will be self-limiting. The simultaneous presence of tax-exempt investors and taxable in-
vestors, however, may raise arbitrage profits rather than reduce tax-rate divergence between in-
vestors. Clientele effects are, therefore, likely to emerge even in this case.
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between prices and present values may, therefore, be inappropriate. Hence, the
type of equilibrium must be determined prior to the execution of the estimation
procedure.
This paper suggests an estimation procedure that does not a priori assume
the presence or absence of clientele effects. The procedure determines whether
or not clientele effects are present and produces an estimator appropriate to its
finding. In addition, Schaefer's assumption of a prohibition on short sales is
replaced with the more realistic assumption of limited short sales. This is the
norm in many major economies, such as the U.S., Great Britain, and Canada.
III. Utility Analysis
Consider an investor maximizing an intertemporal utility function, U : R' —>
R\ defined on consumption levels in future periods, l,...,f. To simplify the
analysis without altering the results, the optimization begins with consumption
in period 1. The investor is permitted to sell bonds short, but the short part of his
portfolio cannot exceed some finite and strictly positive amount, V. Following
Schaefer, a short sales constraint may reflect institutional factors as well as tax
asymmetries. Hence, V, which might be a fraction of the individual's total
portfolio or a fixed dollar amount, is institutionally determined.
A bond makes three types of payments, each of which may be differently
treated for tax purposes: nontaxable retum of principal, ordinary income, and
capital gains. Let Bj be an m X 3 matrix whose /th row is the three-component
vector, {bupbiijMii), of the gross cash flow generated by bond / in period 7.
The three components of this vector correspond to the three types of cash flows.
The gross cash flow from bond / in period j is, therefore.
k=\
Let the mapping T : R^ -* R^ be the tax function, where T is convex to reflect a
progressive tax structure. The argument of T is the investor's cash flow vector,
and T assigns a vector consisting of the tax due on each component of this
cash flow. Hence, an individual's consumption level in period j , Cj equals
[{x-y)Bj-T{{x-y)Bj)]{h), where h is the column vector (1,1,1). A utility
maximizing individual solves
max
(3) s.t. xP-yP < W
yP < V
y,x > 0,
where W is his initial wealth.
Denoting the derivative of a function/ with respect to itsyth argument by
fj, the first order conditions for a maximum are
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(4) Y.^iUj{-))[huj{l-Ti) + b2.j{l-T2) + b3ij{l-Ti)]}-l^P, < 0,
7=1
i = I,... ,m,
t
(5) Y}^Uj{-))[buj{\-Ti) + b2ij{\-T2) + b^ij{\-Ti)Vi-lPi + XPi < 0,
where 5 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the wealth constraint,
{x-y)P < W, and A is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the short sales
constraint.
The contents of the square brackets in (4) and (5) are the after-tax cash flow
from bond / in period y, a^, to an investor in a given tax bracket (the superscript
t having been suppressed). Equations (4) and (5) can be written as
(4a) Y^j{-)aij-lPi < 0, i=\,...,m,
t
(5a) ^ f// • )aij -iPi-XPi < 0, i=\,...,m.
Consider the Lagrangian multipliers in (4a) and (5a): § and A are the shadow
prices (in terms of utility) of the wealth constraint and the short sales constraint,
respectively. Given nonsatiation, § must be strictly positive. If utility increases
when the constraint on short sales is relaxed, the short sales constraint is binding
and A is stricdy positive. Conversely, if utility remains unchanged when the
short sales constraint is relaxed, A is zero.
Let ip be the arbitrage profits (in dollar terms) associated with a one dollar
relaxation in the short sales constraint. Arbitrage profits constitute an increase in
wealth and, from the above discussion, a one dollar increase in wealth increases
utility by §. Hence, a one dollar relaxation in the short sales constraint increases
utility by §(//. But, a one dollar relaxation in the short sales constraint raises
utility by A. Therefore, ^ip - A such that (/^ (= A/5) satisfies 0 < t// < 1.^  If at
the optimum ifJ > 0, then A > 0 and from Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it follows
that J, > 0 for at least one /, / = 1, . . . , w.
Nonsatiation ensures that the wealth constraint is always binding, {x-y)P =
W. Therefore, at the optimum, x ^ 0. In contrast, the vector of short sales, y,
is non-zero only if there are arbitrage opportunities, in which case A > 0 and
(// > 0. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum determine that the left-
hand side of (5a) is equal to zero if y is non-zero. Alternatively, if y = 0, both
A and (// equal zero.
'Consider a one dollar relaxation in the short sales constraint. The investor sells short one
dollar's worth of the (appropriate) overpriced bond. He then buys a proportion of a correctly priced
bond or (portfolio of bonds) that replicates the cash flow of the bond he sold short. The price he
has to pay for the proportion of the correctly priced bond must be less than the one dollar paid for
the comparable part of the overpriced bond. Hence, his profits are 1 - 0 dollars, where 0<6<\
is the price of the proportion of the correctly priced bond. Hence, 0 < 1 - 0 = (// < 1,
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Uj{ • ) / 5 is the marginal utility of consumption in period j normalized by
the initial marginal utility of wealth. Hence, it is period y's discount factor.
Denoting Uj{• ) / § by dj and the vector {di,...,d,) by d, (4a) and (5a) yield




(6c) yi = 0 — ^ ^ f l y = Pi, i = l , . . . , w .
The intuition behind (6b) is that the prices of those bonds that are sold short
must reflect both their cash fiow and their potential arbitrage opportunities: the
present value of the cash fiow of a bond that is sold short captures only part
of that bond's value. When an investor sells bond / short, he (a) foregoes the
cash flow associated with bond /, and (b) makes arbitrage profits. For this he is
paid f,. To avoid making a loss by short selling the bond, the price of the bond
minus the potential arbitrage profits from its short sale must exceed or be equal
to the present value of its cash fiow. The arbitrage profit associated with one
dollar of short sales is ip and the short sale of bond / is an arbitrage transaction
involving f, dollars. Hence, the arbitrage profit is (///',. The price of bond /,
Pi, must therefore satisfy
(7) Pi-ipPi > X
i=i
It follows that when j , > 0,
(8) '^djaij = ( 1 -
IV. Restricted Arbitrage and the Estimation of the Term
Structure
Equilibrium is characterized by the absence of available arbitrage oppor-
tunities for every investor: such opportunities will either have been used up to
the limit of the constraint or not been available in the first place. There are two
cases to consider: either yP is equal to V or yP is equal to zero.
To determine the discount factor in equilibrium, the short sales constraint
must be relaxed. Let x and y in (9) be the changes that occur in the investor's
long and short positions in response to a small relaxation, e, in the short sales
constraint. Starting from his equilibrium, an investor's arbitrage profit maxi-
mization requires that the changes x and y be determined by solving
(9) ma\{y-x)'Ps.t.{y-x)'A < 0, yP < £, x,y > 0.
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The dual of (9) is^
(10) mini//s.t. (1-(/y)/ ' < Ad < P, d,ip > 0.
The constraints in (10) tum out to be identical with the first order conditions
for utility maximization, thereby confirming the link between utility and arbi-
trage maximization. Moreover, since the solution to (10) must satisfy Ad < P,
this solution allows for the presence of clientele effects, d, which solves (10), is
an estimator of the term structure. Since d is based on fully exploited arbitrage,
it is consistent with utility maximization and independent of initial wealth, W.
Since the elements of A are net of tax cash fiows, d does, however, depend on
the investor's marginal tax bracket.
If the optimal value of (10) is zero, {ip = 0), all bonds are correctly priced
and no clientele effects are present for this tax bracket. On the other hand, if
ip is positive. Ad is less than or equal to P, and for some bonds. Ad must be
smaller than P. Arbitrage activity is blocked by the short sales constraint, and
clientele effects are present.
Problem (10) can be expressed as
t
(11) min max Z, = {Pi-'^aijdj)/Pi.
d>0, i=l,...,m 7=1
Ad<P
This formulation of problem (11) highlights an intuitively appealing prop-
erty of d: for a given d, the bond that provides an investor in a given tax bracket
with the most profitable arbitrage activity is bond «, where Zn = max,=| ^Z,.
The estimator of d, d, minimizes the arbitrage retum to bond n. It is in the
nature of competitive markets that the actions of participants in such markets
eliminate arbitrage opportunities. If such elimination is not possible, market
forces reduce arbitrage opportunities to their lowest possible level: in a market
where, as a result of institutional constraints, arbitrage opportunities cannot dis-
appear, they will be minimized both directly and by market pressure on other
variables. In the situation discussed in this paper, d will adjust so as to minimize
Zn, reflecting the actions of investors.
'Problem (9) may be written in a linear programming canonical form as
ma\{x, y)'
:(,y > 0,
where 0 is a 1 X m column vector of zeroes. The dual of (7) is, thus,
::
d,tp > 0,
Some algebraic manipulations show that this dual problem is equivalent to (10) in the text.
442 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
In addition to yielding an estimator of the term structure, the methodology
developed here facilitates the identification of bonds with clientele effects. If
element / in the vector Ad is smaller than the price of bond /, this bond is
identified as having clientele effects. This method of identifying bonds with
clientele effects evolves naturally from the model used in this paper.
In contrast, Schaefer's model does not provide an estimator based on the
investor's optimization. Schaefer suggests that d can be estimated by solving
(12) max y 45; s.t. Ad<P, d>0.
where 5 = (si , . . . , x,) is an arbitrary, prespecified cash fiow. The arbitrariness of
s implies that the term structure estimator, d{s), is similarly arbitrary. Schaefer
appears to recognize the weakness of this estimator and does not attempt to
identify overpriced bonds by using d{s). Instead, he suggests the following
technique to identify overpriced bonds. For each tax bracket, determine the
maximum value of bond i {i= \,...,m) over all feasible vectors, d £ {d\Ad <
P,d> 0}. Define this maximum value as
(13) Ri = max'^aijdj s.t. Ad<P, d>0.
and the optimal solution of (13) by d'.
If the price of bond / exceeds its present value, the bond is overpriced:
duality theory can be used to prove the existence of a lower priced bond or
portfolio generating the same after-tax cash fiow as bond /. Bond / is, therefore,
incorrectly priced for the tax bracket in question. Furthermore, in (10) and (12),
the ith constraint, Xj=i "ijdj ^ Pi, is superfiuous and can be removed without
altering the shape of the feasible set. Ad < P. Also, there is no feasible d that
satisfies Xy=i "•j'^j - P'-
The solution of (13), d.', developed by Schaefer, maximizes the value of
each bond, i, whereas the estimator developed in this paper does not. Hence,
(14) Y^a'jdij > Y^aid, i = l , . . . , m .
y=i y=i
Hence, as acknowledged by Schaefer, his condition for a bond to display
clientele effects is sufficient rather than necessary. Schaefer's method provides
a lower bound on the number of bonds that have clientele effects. The method
developed here generates more such bonds with a single estimator of d.
V. Conclusions
Tax regulations have recently been shown to be capable of driving a wedge
between the prices of certain bonds and their present values. In the presence
of such a wedge, the use of regression analysis to estimate the term structure
is incorrect. There is, therefore, a need for a method that identifies bonds
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characterized by clientele effects, as well as for an appropriate procedure for
estimating the term structure in the presence of such effects. This paper satis-
fies these needs by developing a procedure that simultaneously determines the
presence of clientele effects and provides an appropriate estimator of the term
structure.
The proposed means of identifying bonds characterized by clientele effects
is endogenous to the model rather than based on extraneous considerations.
The suggested estimator is based on the optimizing behavior of an investor in a
market with frictions, and it emerges directly from the solution of the dual of the
no-arbitrage optimization problem. The estimator reduces perceived arbitrage
opportunities in the market, emulating the effect of competition. Finally, the
proposed estimator bypasses the typical trade-off between theoretical validity
and pragmatic considerations. While being theoretically sound, the estimator is
straightforward to apply.
References
Dammon, M, R,. and C, R, Green, "Tax Arbitrage and the Existence of Equlibrium Prices for
Financial Assets," Journal of Finance, 42 (Dec, 1987), 1143-1166,
Jordan, J, V, "Tax Effects in Term Structure Estimation," Journal of Finance, 39 (June 1984),
393^06,
Litzenberger, R, H,, and J, Rolfo, "An Intemational Study of Tax Effects on Govemment Bonds,"
Journal of Finance, 39 (March 1984), 1-22,
Prisman, E, Z, "Bond Pricing in Markets with Taxes: the Clientele Model vs, the Non-Clientele
Model," Journal of Banking and Finance, 14 (March 1990), 33-39,
Schaefer, S, M, "Measuring a Tax Specific Term Structure of Interest Rates in the Market for British
Govemment Securities," The Economic Journal, 91 (June 1981), 415^38,
"Tax Induced Clientele Effects in the Market for British Govemment Secu-
rities," Journal of Financial Economics, 10 (July 1982a), 121-159,
_, "Taxes and Security Market Equilibrium," In Financial Economics: Essays
in Honor of Paul H. Cootner, W, F, Sharpe and C, M, Cootner, eds, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall (1982b), 159-178,
